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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses all of the instances that the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (hereinafter “ECCC”) can proceed against the accused in his or her absence.
Specifically, this memorandum examines: the right of the accused to consensually waive his or
her right to be present; the accused’s waiver of the right to be present through disrupting the
court; and the problems with proceeding against the accused in absentia. * This memorandum
also gives particular attention to the role that illness plays as a factor in assessing the right to be
present, and the role of technology as a tool to gain the presence of the accused in the courtroom.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The Accused Can Surrender His or Her Right to Be Present by Consenting to a Waiver
The accused can waive his or her right to be present in the courtroom. Although the
ECCC’s Internal Rules address the consent to waive the right in an illness provision, there are no
specified prerequisites to a waiver. International opinion suggests that the accused can waive the
right to be present in any situation.
2. The Accused Can Waive His or Her Right to Be Present Through Disruptive Behavior
The accused can waive his or her right to be present in the courtroom through disrupting
the courtroom. When the ECCC considers removing the accused because of disruptive behavior,
the court must balance the proportionality of restricting the accused’s fundamental right to be
present against the court’s objective of maintaining an orderly and efficient trial. Ideally, the
*

Under what circumstances can the Trial Chamber proceed with trial in the physical absence of
the accused in the courtroom, with and without his or her consent? What is the law relating to
remote participation by the accused by electronic or other means? Distinguish mental unfitness
to stand trial from his physical inability to attend the court.
6
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court must not overly restrict the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom. Previously, other
tribunals determined that boycotting the trial out of protest and the loud outbursts by the accused
are disruptive behaviors.
3. Trials In Absentia are Frowned Upon, Even When the Trial Does Not Violate the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Most tribunals acknowledge that a trial in absentia is when a court proceeds against the
accused without the accused’s participation in any of the proceedings, and the accused did not
waive the right to be present. Trials in absentia are not consistent with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”) and the ECCC’s Internal Rules.
Although many civil law states justify trials in absentia by guaranteeing a right to a retrial, the
practice is still frowned upon. Moreover, the ECCC’s Internal Rules prescribe that the accused
must be present during the proceedings at some point, or the accused must at least be in custody
and choose not to attend the proceedings. Thus, a trial in absentia violates the ECCC’s Internal
Rules.
Contrarily, if the accused is present during the trial at some point, or waives the right to
be present, the trial is not considered in absentia. Rather, if the accused fails to attend part of the
trial, the ECCC can proceed in the absence of the accused, under Rule 81(4) of the ECCC’s
Internal Rules.
4. Illness of the Accused is a Factor Only When He or She is Unfit to Stand Trial
As a general rule, most courts suspend trial when the accused is too ill to attend. The
court usually bases its decision to suspend trial on an expert’s opinion. As long as the accused
can participate in his or her own defense and sufficiently exercise his or her rights, then the
accused is fit to stand trial. Furthermore, the court can deem health issues a disruption to the
court’s proceedings, and it can restrict the accused’s rights accordingly.
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5. Video Presence does not Equal Physical Presence
The accused is permitted to participate in the proceedings through a two-way video-link
when the accused waives his or her right to be present through a waiver by consent or disruptive
behavior. Many national courts and international tribunals acknowledge that a person’s presence
through a two-way video-link does not constitute physical presence in the courtroom. Although,
when a witness testifies through a two-way video-link, the court extends the courtroom to the
witness’ location to protect the accused’s right to confront the witness in court. Following the
latter’s logic, as long as the accused could fully participate in the proceedings, the Chambers
could extend the courtroom to the accused’s location. As long as the Chambers extend the
courtroom to the location of the accused, the Chambers could proceed with the accused’s
participation through video-link without violating the accused’s rights.
II. LAW GOVERNING THE ECCC AND BACKGROUND
A. ECCC Law
The Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia of
2003 (hereinafter the “Agreement”) enumerates the provisions that the ECCC must follow when
it conducts a trial. Under Article 13 of the Agreement, “the rights of the accused enshrined in
Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [(hereinafter
“ICCPR”)] shall be respected throughout the trial process.”1
Furthermore, the Agreement declares that the accused shall have, “the right: to a fair and
public hearing . . . to engage a counsel of his or her choice . . . and to examine or have examined

1

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, Article 13, 6 June 2003, entered into force 29 April 2005, U.N. Doc.
A/Res57/228B(Annex)(13 May 2003). [Reproduced at Tab 23].
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the witnesses against him or her.”2 Although the Agreement enumerates various rights that the
accused has, it does not mention the right to be present in court.
Correspondingly, the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (hereinafter the “Establishment Law”) reiterates the rights of the accused as
provided in the Agreement. The Establishment Law does not enumerate the accused’s rights, but
Article 47 proclaims that the Agreement shall apply as law.3 Thus, the enumeration of accused’s
rights in the Agreement is law in the ECCC, in accordance with the Establishment Law.
Furthermore, the Establishment Law asserts that the court, “shall exercise their jurisdiction in
accordance with the international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set out
in Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”4
Under the Establishment Law, the ECCC is bound to follow Articles 14 and 15 of the
ICCPR. Under Article 14 the accused has the right:
(a) [t]o be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him . . .
(b) . . . to communicate with counsel of his own choosing . . . (d)
[t]o be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing . . . (e) [t]o examine,
or have examined, the witnesses against him . . . .5

2

Id.

3

Id. at Article 47.

4

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Article 33, 27
October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). [Reproduced at Tab 28].
5

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16, 1966,
Article 14(3), B.A. res. 2200A9XXI, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). [Reproduced at Tab 27].
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Similarly, the ECCC’s Internal Rules provide that, “[t]he accused shall be tried in his or her
presence . . . .”6 Nevertheless, Rule 81 of the Internal Rules provides exceptions to the accused’s
right to be present in the courtroom.
One exception affords that when the accused, “following an initial appearance and having
been duly summoned to the subsequent hearing, continues to refuse or fails to attend the
proceedings, or is expelled from them . . . the proceedings may continue in his or her absence.”7
Likewise, if the accused is expelled from the proceedings, he or she can, “observe the trial over
closed-circuit television . . . [and] at all times, remain in telephone contact with his or her
lawyer.”8
Another exception states that if, “due to health reasons or other serious concerns, the
Accused cannot be present before the Chamber, it may, with the consent of the Accused,
continue the proceedings in his or her absence.”9 Furthermore, the accused can “request to follow
the proceedings by appropriate audiovisual means.”10
In the event of a procedural dispute, the Establishment Law provides the catch all phrase
that, “[i]f these existing procedures do not deal with a particular matter . . . guidance may be

6

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 81(1), Rev. 5, 9
February 2010. [Reproduced at Tab 26].
7

Id. at 81(4) (emphasis added).

8

Id. at Rule 37(2).

9

Id. at Rule 81(5).

10

Id.
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sought in procedural rules established at the international level.”11 Thus, all disputes over a
particular procedural problem will be resolved by international opinion on the matter.
B. Background on the Right to be Present in International Law
The ECCC is bound to implement all of the rights afforded to the accused under Articles
14 and 15 of the ICCPR. Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR declares that the accused has the right
“to be tried in his presence . . . .”12 While the accused has the right to be present in the
courtroom, the majority opinion is that the right is not absolute.
The accused’s right to be present during the proceedings is common throughout human
rights treaties. For example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and the American Convention on Human Rights acknowledge the
accused’s right to be present at the proceedings.13
Neither the European Convention nor the American Convention explicitly guarantees the
accused the right to be present. But the right is implied through its other guarantees, such as, “the
right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own
choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel.”14 The accused’s right to
11

Id. at Article 33.

12

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16,
1966, Article 14(3)(d), B.A. res. 2200A9XXI, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). [Reproduced at Tab 27].
13

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
entered into force as amended on November 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 as amended by
Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and protocol No. 8., E.T.S. 118, and
Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. 155. [Reproduced at Tab 25]; American Convention on Human Rights,
Article 8(d), Signed on November 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M 673; entered into force on July 18, 1978.
[Reproduced at Tab 24].
14

American Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(d), Signed on November 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M
673; entered into force on July 18, 1978. [Reproduced at Tab 24].
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choose counsel and to communicate with counsel implies that the accused must be present to
exercise the right.
Furthermore, many national constitutions acknowledge that the accused’s right to be
present can be waived in certain circumstances. M. Cherif Bassiouni, in his study of the rights
afforded to the accused under national jurisdictions, found that 25 countries guarantee the
accused’s right to be present.15 Bassiouni also found that many countries, such as Antigua and
Barbuda and the Bahamas, provided exceptions to the right to be present at trial.16 Some of the
exceptions stated that trial shall be held when: “the accused flees jurisdiction during trial or after
having been given notice of the charge, or when the conduct of the accused renders the
continuance of the proceedings in his or her presence impossible.”17
Even the international human rights group Amnesty International acknowledges that the
accused can waive his or her right to be present. The group states that the accused waives his or
her rights when “the accused persons deliberately absent themselves from the proceedings after
they have begun, or have been so disruptive that they have had to be removed from the
courtroom.”18

15

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 235, 279 (1993). [Reproduced at Tab 12].
16

Id. at 280.

17

Id.

18

Stan Starygin and Johanna Selth, Cambodia and the Right to be Present: Trials in Absentia in
the Draft Criminal Procedure Code, 2005 Sing J. Legal Stud. 170, 172 (2005). (emphasis in
orginial). [Reproduced at Tab 21].
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Likewise, Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker19 found that there are three lawful exceptions
to the right to be present in the courtroom. They found international consensus that the accused
does not have to be present when: (1) “there exists an unfettered right of retrial . . . [(2)] where a
disruptive defendant is removed from the courtroom. . . [and (3)] where the accused has
voluntarily waived the right to be present.”20 Therefore, as many national jurisdictions and
scholars indicate, the accused can waive the right to be present in the courtroom.
III. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Waiving the Right to be Present
1. Consensual Waiver
The ECCC’s Internal Rules provide that, “if due to health reasons or other serious
concerns, the Accused cannot be present before the Chamber, it may, with the consent of the
Accused, continue the proceedings in his or her absence.”21 Thus, the Internal Rules indicate that
the accused may voluntarily waive his or her right to be present in certain serious situations.

19

Wayne Jordash is admitted as a Barrister in England & Wales, where he practices at Doughty
Street Chambers. He has served as Defence Counsel in various cases before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and as a Consultant for the Defence Section at the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
Tim Parker is admitted as a Barrister in Hong Kong, where he practices at Denis Chang S.C.’s
Chambers, predominantly in the areas of public law, human rights and international law. He also
has experience of working with the Defence Section at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia.
20

Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, Symposium: The Role of Defense in International Criminal
Tribunals: Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Incompatibility with
International Human Rights Law, 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 487, 490 (2010). [Reproduced at Tab 15].
21

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 81(5), Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010 (emphasis added). [Reproduced at Tab 26].
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Other international tribunals take a more expansive stance on when the accused can
waive his or her right to be present. For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (hereinafter
“STL”) Rules of Procedure and Evidence declare simply that the accused can waive his or her
right to be present, and the trial shall proceed in his or her absence.22 The Appeals Chamber for
the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR”) asserted in dicta that, “[a]n
accused person can waive or forfeit the right to be present at trial.”23
Similar to the ECCC, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(hereinafter “ICTY”) also has acknowledged the accused’s ability to waive his or her right to be
present at trial. In Prosecutor v. Simic (hereinafter “Simic”), the accused was “rendered a
paraplegic subsequent to the events charged in the Indictment, [and] suffer[ed] from medical
complications due to this condition.”24 The accused signed, “a total of 25 . . . waivers of the right
to be present in the court during the proceedings . . . .”25 The waivers were required, even though
the accused still participated in the proceedings through a one-way video-link system and a twoway telephone link between the accused and his counsel.26 Unfortunately, the court did not
specify on the record why so many waivers were required.

22

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 106(A)(i), adopted on
20 March 2009), U.N. Doc. STL/BD/2009/01Rev.2 (30 October 2009). [Reproduced at Tab 34].
23

Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-73-AR73, 7, Decision 30 October 2006. [Reproduced
at Tab 11].
24

Prosecutor v. Simic, IT95-9/2-S, 3, Sentencing Judgment 17 October 2002. [Reproduced at
Tab [Reproduced at Tab 8].
25

Id. at 4.

26

Id.
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In many of the international courts and tribunals, the accused’s right to be present in the
courtroom is not absolute. Furthermore, the Simic case indicates that the court reveres the
accused’s right to be present in the courtroom, as indicated by its requiring the 25 waivers.
Despite the importance of the accused’s presence in the courtroom, Simic indicates that the
accused is still permitted to waive the right to be present. Likewise, the Simic court did not
articulate any conditions that must be present for the accused to waive the right to be present.
Thus, according to the STL, ICTR and the ICTY, the accused can waive his or her right
to be present at any time, and in any situation. On this basis, it appears that the ECCC can
proceed against the accused any time that he or she consensually waives the right to be present.
2. Waiver Through Disruptive Behavior
a. International Tribunal Rules and Procedures on Removing the Accused When He or She
is Disruptive
Under the ECCC’s Internal Rules, “[i]f an Accused disrupts proceedings before the
Chambers, they may order that the Accused be removed from the courtroom . . . .”27
Furthermore, the court may order that the accused, “where possible, observe the trial over
closed-circuit television . . . [and] in such cases, the Accused may, at all times, remain in
telephone contact with his or her lawyer.”28 Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker29 declare that in such

27

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 37(2), Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010 (emphasis added). [Reproduced at Tab 26].
28

Id. (emphasis added).

29

Credentials produced at Supra note 19.
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cases, “the justification [for removing the accused without consent is] . . . that the person has
abused the right to be present . . .”30
Many of the international courts and tribunals have pre-established procedures that go
into effect when the accused disrupts the proceedings. The ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provide that, “[t]he Trial Chamber may order the removal of an accused from the
proceedings and continue the proceedings in his absence if he has persisted in disruptive conduct
following a warning that he may be removed.”31 Similar to the ICTR, the ICTY’s removal rule
provides for a warning, then removal of the accused. 32 The ICTY’s removal rule does not
provide for video-link technology, nor does it provide for telephone contact between the accused
and his or her lawyer.33
The ECCC’s removal rule resembles the ICTR’s and ICTY’s removal rules because all of
the rules provide that the trial Chambers can remove the accused when he or she is disruptive.
Furthermore, the ECCC’s rule provides that the accused may, “where possible, observe the trial
over closed-circuit television . . . .” 34 The words “where possible” indicate that the court does
not always have to provide the accused with a closed-circuit television. Thus, the ECCC’s rule is
30

Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, Symposium: The Role of Defense in International Criminal
Tribunals: Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Incompatibility with
International Human Rights Law, 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 487, 490 (2010). [Reproduced at Tab 15].
31

Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 80(B), International Criminal Court for Rwanda,
adopted on 29 June 1995, Revised 1 October 2009. [Reproduced at Tab 32].
32

Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 80(B), International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (1994), revised on 10 December 2009. [Reproduced at Tab
31].
33

Id.

34

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 37(2), Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010 (emphasis added). [Reproduced at Tab 26].
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extremely similar to ICTR’s and the ICTY’s removal rules that do not require the Trial
Chambers to accommodate the accused with closed circuit television. Therefore, any ICTR or
ICTY Appeals Chamber decisions on their respective removal rules would make logical sense
when applied to the ECCC’s removal rule.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber, in Milosevic v. Prosecutor (hereinafter “Milosevic”),
declared that the court should use a rule of proportionality when it restricts a fundamental right
of the accused.35 In Milosevic, the accused contested the Trial Chamber’s decision to appoint
counsel to the accused because the accused’s health issues delayed numerous proceedings. 36 The
Trial Chambers appointed counsel to the accused after the accused had already exercised his
right to self-representation.37 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that the right to self-representation
is similar to the accused’s right to be tried in his presence.38 The Appellate Chamber noted that
the two rights are found in the very same ICTY statutory clause, and the court classified both
rights as fundamental rights.39
The Appeals Chamber held that it must follow the proportionality principle that, “any
restriction of a fundamental right must be in service of a sufficiently important objective, and

35

Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Para. 17, IT-02-54, Decision 1 December 2004. [Reproduced at Tab
3].
36

Id. at Para. 7.

37

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, IT-02-54, Para. 64, 65, Reason for Decision 22 September 2004.
[Reproduced at Tab 4].
38

Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Para. 13, IT-02-54, Decision 1 December 2004. [Reproduced at Tab
3].
39

Id.

17

Jon-Paul McConnell
Memorandum
Fall Semester, 2010
must impair the right no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.”40 Furthermore, the
Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber’s removal of Milosevic’s right to selfrepresentation “relegates [the accused] to a visibly second-tier role in the trial.” 41 The Appeals
Chamber did not disagree with the decision to appoint counsel, but it disagreed with the extent
that the Trial Chamber restricted the accused’s right.
The ICTR declared in Zigranyirazo v. Prosecutor (hereinafter “Zigranyirazo”) that it
would follow the ICTY’s proportionality standard when it restricted any of the accused’s
fundamental rights.42 In Zigranyirazo, the Trial Chamber restricted the accused’s right to be
present at trial because the accused could not attend a witness’ testimony in The Hague.43 The
accused was permitted to participate in the proceedings, with his primary counsel, through a twoway closed circuit television in Arusha.44 The Appeals Chamber held that the accused’s inability
to attend trial in The Hague did not warrant a restriction of the accused’s right to be present in
the courtroom.45 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber held that the accused and his counsel’s
participation through a two-way video-link violated his right to examine the witness because the
accused could not view all of the witness’ diagrams and charts.46

40

Id. at Para. 17 (internal quotations omitted)(internal grammar omitted).

41

Id. at Para. 19.

42

Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-73-AR73, Para. 14, Decision 30 October 2006.
[Reproduced at Tab 11].
43

Id. at Para. 5.

44

Id.

45

Id. at Para. 15.

46

Id. at Para. 23.
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The similarities between the ICTR and the ICTY’s removal rules with the ECCC’s
removal rule warrant a similar application of the ICTR and ICTY’s proportionality standard.
Therefore, the court should restrict the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom only to the
extent necessary to force compliance with the court’s objective.
b. Behaviors Regarded as Disruptive
The ECCC’s Internal Rules specify that, “[i]f an Accused disrupts proceedings before the
Chambers, they may order that the Accused be removed from the courtroom . . . .”47 Although
the ECCC’s Internal Rules do not define behavior that is considered disruptive, other courts have
identified various disruptive behaviors. The two most cited types of disruptive behaviors are
boycotting the trial and interrupting the proceedings through outbursts.
One example of the accused disrupting the trial through boycotting is Prosecutor v. Sesay
et al. (hereinafter “Sesay”) in the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter “SCSL”). In Sesay,
the accused wrote a letter stating that he would not attend the trial because he did not believe in
the legitimacy of the court.48 The Trial Chamber deemed the accused’s willful non-attendance at
the proceedings as a disruption because it is a “frustration to the ends of justice without
justification . . . .”49 The Trial Chamber also reasoned that the accused’s behavior was

47

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 37(2), Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010. [Reproduced at Tab 26].
48

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Ruling, Para. 10, 12 July 2004. [Reproduced at Tab 7].

49

Id. at Para. 8.
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tantamount to a waiver of his right to be present.50 Therefore, the Trial Chamber held that it
could proceed against the accused in his absence.51
Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Norman et al. (hereinafter “Norman”), the accused refused to
attend trial, but did not tell the court he would not attend the trial.52 The SCSL reasoned that, “an
Accused person charged with serious crimes who refuses to appear in court should not be
permitted to obstruct the judicial machinery . . . by deliberately being absent . . . .”53 Therefore,
the SCSL held that it would proceed without the presence of the accused.54
In many instances, the accused have obnoxiously disrupted the courtroom. For example,
during the Dujail trial in the Iraqi High Tribunal (hereinafter “IHT”), Saddam Hussein, “yelled at
the judge to ‘go to hell’ and called the judge a homosexual, a dog, and a whoremonger.”55
The IHT judges took various measures to regain control over the courtroom. The first
presiding judge “attempted to deal with such disruptive behavior by ignoring it.”56 When the first

50

Id. at Para. 12.

51

Id.

52

Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Para. 2, SCSL-2004-14-T, Ruling 1 October 2004. [Reproduced
at Tab 6].
53

Id. at Para. 17.

54

Id. at Para. 24.

55

Michael P. Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and
Contumacious Counsel in War Cries Trials, 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, 163 (2006/2007).
[Reproduced at Tab 19].
56

Id. at 164.
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judge was removed, the second judge gave a warning, appointed stand-by counsel, and then had
some of the accused removed from the courtroom and continued the proceedings.57
Even national common law courts—which take an individual-rights approach to
proceedings—remove the accused, and proceed in his or her absence, when he or she is
disruptive. In US v. Massaoui, the accused kept making abhorrent statements to the court, both
criticizing the court and making political speeches.58 The judge asked the accused if he could
remain quite throughout the proceedings, and he answered that he would not remain quiet.59 The
judge removed the accused from juror selection because the accused constantly interrupted the
proceedings.60
National and international consensus rests on the side of the court proceeding in the
absence of the accused, when the accused disrupts the proceedings. The SCSL cases indicate that
the accused’s willful absence from the courtroom, whether explained in writing or not, is
considered disrupting the courtroom, and a waiver of the right to be present.
Furthermore, in the more obvious cases of courtroom disruption, the court usually warns
the accused, then removes the accused and proceeds without the accused. Proceedings in the
Massaoui and Dujail cases indicate that the accused can be removed at any stage of the trial, and
the court can proceed without the accused.

57

Michael P. Scharf and Gregory S. McNeal, Saddam on Trial: Understanding and Debating the
Iraqi High Tribunal, 143 (2006). [Reproduced at Tab 41].
58
59

David Stout, Moussaoui is Banned from Courtroom, N.Y. Times, February 14, 2006.
Id. at Para. 8. [Reproduced at Tab 36].

60

Transcript of Hearing, United States v. Zacaria Moussaoui, 186 Fed. Appx. 399, para. 7,8
(2006) (No. 1546). [Reproduced at Tab 39].
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One critical observation is that, in the cited cases, when the accused has been removed
from the courtroom, he has not been removed permanently. Rather, the Trial Chambers only
removed the accused from the courtroom for a short period, and later permitted reentry.
Therefore, most courts recognize that when the accused disrupts the proceedings, he or she does
not permanently waive the right to be present.
B. Proceeding Without a Waiver
1. General Opinion—Proceeding Without a Waiver Violates the Accused’s Rights
Under the Establishment Law, the ECCC is bound to grant the accused all of the rights
provided for in Article 14 of the ICCPR.61 Under Article 14(3)(d), the accused has the right “to
be tried in his presence.”62 Under the ECCC’s Internal Rules, the accused has the ability to waive
the right to be present, and the court can proceed in his or her absence, after he or she has waived
the right to be present.63 If the accused does not waive his or her right, then the court should not
proceed, lest the court violate his or her right.
Most courts do not condone proceeding against the accused in his or her absence without
a waiver. For example, in Zigiranyirazo, the accused could not attend the trial in The Hague to
hear witness testimony.64 The Trial Chamber declared that it would proceed against the accused

61

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Article 33, 27
October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). [Reproduced at Tab 28].
62

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 13, opened for signature
December 16, 1966, B.A. res. 2200A9XXI, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). [Reproduced at Tab 27].
63

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 81, Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010. [Reproduced at Tab 26].
64

Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-73-AR73, Para. 2, Decision 30 October 2006.
[Reproduced at Tab 11].
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in his absence, and it declared that the accused and his counsel could view the proceedings
through a video-link.65 The accused never waived his right to be present in the courtroom, nor
did the accused disrupt the proceedings.66 In response, the Appeals Chamber held that the
accused’s right to be present in the courtroom was violated because he did not waive his right to
be present, and the Appeals Chamber did not accept the video-link as a form of “presence.”67
Thus, the Appeals Chamber excluded the witness’s testimony.68
As the Zigiranyirazo Appellate Chamber indicated, courts should not proceed against the
accused, in his or her absence, without the accused’s waiver of the right to be present.
Furthermore, the court indicated that when the accused is denied the right to be present, any
evidence offered against the accused in his or her absence should be excluded. Thus, proceeding
against the accused in his or her absence, without his or her waiver, will likely be held to violate
the accused’s right, and it will get evidence excluded.
2. The Ultimate Form of Proceeding Without a Waiver—Trial in Absentia
Many international tribunals try to guarantee the accused’s right at his or her own trial
because, a trial in absentia violates the accused’s rights granted under the ICCPR.69 Even when
the accused’s rights are protected through a right to retrial, scholars and practitioners still frown
upon a trial in absentia. A trial in absentia is very different from a trial where the accused

65

Id. at Para. 6.

66

Id. at Para. 5.

67

Id. at Para. 23.

68

Id. at Para. 24.
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Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for
Fair Trial Rights, 8 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 1, 15 (2009). [Reproduced at Tab 20].

23

Jon-Paul McConnell
Memorandum
Fall Semester, 2010
waived his or her right to be present. The common understanding of a trial in absentia is when
the Trial Chamber proceeds against the accused: a) when the accused does not interact with the
court; b) the accused does not appoint counsel; and c) the accused has never appeared before the
court.70
If a trial is held in absentia as to the accused, then the accused is not able to exercise the
rights granted to him or her under the ICCPR. Most significantly, the accused cannot exercise the
rights:
(a) [t]o be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him . . .
(b) . . . to communicate with counsel of his own choosing . . . (d)
[t]o be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing . . . (e) [t]o examine,
or have examined, the witnesses against him . . . .71
Many civil law systems, consider a trail in absentia a viable alternative to proceeding in
the presence of the accused, even though a trial in absentia violates the ICCPR. A civil law
analysis of trials in absentia is important because Cambodia has a civil law system. Civil law
countries, “found a way around the prohibition by having the in absentia [sic] conviction be
subject to a trial de novo [sic] on the facts whenever an accused found guilty in absentia [sic] has
been apprehended.”72 Under the French Code of Criminal Procedure, “if an accused person is

70

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 104, Rule 106, adopted
on 20 March 2009), U.N. Doc. STL/BD/2009/01Rev.2 (30 October 2009). [Reproduced at Tab
34].
71

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16,
1966, Article 14(3), B.A. res. 2200A9XXI, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). [Reproduced at Tab 27].
72

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 235, 280 (1993). [Reproduced at Tab 12].
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given proper notice and fails to appear, he or she can be tried as if they were present”73
Furthermore, the French Code asserts that the accused has a right to retrial if they were tried in
absentia.74
The civil law system, unlike, “a rights based approach to the law, like the common law . .
. [is engaged in] the inquisitive search for the substantial truth.”75 The civil law states further
argue for trials in absentia because, “trials in absentia at least produce a full airing of the
evidence, and if the accused has retained or appointed counsel, then all the evidence may be
tested properly in any event.”76 The civil law countries also argue that a trial in absentia satisfies
the victims right, “to have the accused brought to justice . . . .”77 Various European Union
countries, including: France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, permit trials in absentia,
and all of these countries ratified the ICCPR.78

73

Stan Starygin and Johanna Selth, Cambodia and the Right to be Present: Trials in Absentia in
the Draft Criminal Procedure Code, 2005 Sing J. Legal Stud. 170, 174 (2005) (internal
quotations omitted). [Reproduced at Tab 21].
74

Id.
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Stan Starygin and Johanna Selth, Cambodia and the Right to be Present: Trials in Absentia in
the Draft Criminal Procedure Code, 2005 Sing J. Legal Stud. 170, 173 (2005) (internal
quotations omitted). [Reproduced at Tab 21].
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Id.
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On an international level, the STL has implemented trails in absentia into its criminal
proceedings.79 The Statute of the STL has a provision that permits trials in absentia when the
accused:
(a) [h]as expressly and in writing waived his or her right to be
present; (b) [h]as not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State
authorities concerned; (c) [h]as absconded or otherwise cannot be
found and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her
appearance . . . .80
The Statute also provides that, “[i]n the case of conviction in absentia, the accused . . .shall have
the right to be retried in his or her presence before the [STL].”81 Thus, the STL does not violate
the ICCPR because it guarantees the accused the right to retrial in his or her presence.
While the Statute of the STL thus permits and justifies trials in absentia, scholars criticize
the practice on numerous grounds. Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker82 criticize the accused’s right
to a retrial under the STL. They argue that the wording of the statute provides the right to retrial
only while the STL is in session, and the right dissipates after the STL is dissolved.83 Thus, they
argue that the accused does not have a permanent right to retrial.84 On this interpretation, the

79

Paola Gaeta, To be (Present) or Not to be (Present): Trials In Absentia before the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 JICJ 1165, 1166 (2007). [Reproduced at Tab 14].
80

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Article 22, adopted by the Security Council on 29
March 2006, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757. [Reproduced at Tab 34]
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Id.
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See, Supra note 19 for credentials.
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Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, Symposium: The Role of Defense in International Criminal
Tribunals: Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Incompatibility with
International Human Rights Law, 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 487, 497 (2010). [Reproduced at Tab 15].
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accused’s lack of a right to retrial circumvents jurisprudence and custom that requires the
accused’s right to retrial in his or her presence.85
Unlike the STL, the majority of the international community voted not to include trials in
absentia in the International Criminal Court’s (hereinafter “ICC”) Statute. In the Draft Statute of
Rome, Article 37 provided for a trial in absentia.86 After the Draft Statute of Rome was written,
“[t]he question whether trial in absentia [sic] should be permissible under the Statute [was]
extensively discussed in the Commission, in the Sixth Committee and in the written Comments
of Governments.”87 The final version of the Statute of Rome did not contain the section on trials
in absentia.88 Thus, after substantial consideration, the international community ultimately
rejected the idea of trials in absentia for the ICC.
Therefore, while civil law countries and the STL use trials in absentia, and their
proceedings are arguably in keeping with the ICCPR, such trials are often criticized.
Furthermore, the international community, at the Rome Conference, did not assent to the practice
of trials in absentia by the ICC. The international community did not assent to the practice,
despite the theory that the accused’s right to retrial in his or her presence may seem to satisfy
ICCPR requirements.
The established ECCC Internal Rules prescribe that the accused must be present in the
proceedings, unless the accused: has waived his or her right or disrupts the court, or “following
85

Id

.
Daniel J. Brown, The International Criminal Court and Trial in Absentia, 24 Brooklyn J. Int’l
L. 763, 782 (1999). [Reproduced at Tab 13].
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the Security Council on 17 July
1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998). [Reproduced at Tab 29].
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an initial appearance and having been duly summoned to the subsequent hearing, continues to
refuse or fails to attend the proceedings . . . .”89 Although as a civil-law court, the ECCC could
theoretically have a trial in absentia without violating the accused’s right to be present, the
ECCC’s Internal Rules make arguing for a trial in absentia very difficult. The rules indicate that
the accused must at least make one appearance before the court can proceed against the accused
in his or her absence. Thus, even if the court guaranteed a retrial to the accused, the accused’s
waiver-less trial entirely in absentia is in violation of the ECCC’s Internal Rules.
3. Proceeding After an Initial Appearance is Not a Trial In Absentia
The ECCC’s Internal Rules declare that if the accused, “following an initial appearance
and having been duly summoned to the subsequent hearing, continues to refuse or fails to attend
the proceedings . . . the proceedings may continue in his or her absence.”90 Thus, as long as the
accused has appeared at an initial hearing, the ECCC does not need the accused’s waiver to
proceed in his or her absence.
Similarly, Rule 104 of the STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence state that, “[o]nce an
accused has appeared before the Tribunal in person, by video-conference, or by Counsel
appointed or accepted by him, without having expressly and in writing waived his right to be
present . . . the proceedings shall not be deemed to be in absentia . . . .”91 Thus, the STL’s Rules

89

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 81, Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010. [Reproduced at Tab 26].
90

Id.

91

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 104, adopted on 20
March 2009), U.N. Doc. STL/BD/2009/01Rev.2 (30 October 2009) (emphasis added).
[Reproduced at Tab 34].
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of Procedure and Evidence do not indicate that the accused must continue to remain at trial after
the initial appearance.
Likewise, the SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence declare that the Trial Chamber
can proceed if the accused refuses to be present. Rule 82 bis states that the court can proceed,
“provided that the Trial Chamber is satisfied that: (i) the accused has made his initial appearance
. . . (ii) the Registrar has duly notified the accused that he is required to be present for trial; (iii)
the interests if the accused are represented by counsel.”92
Therefore, the ECCC, STL, and SCSL rules indicate the international opinion that a court
can legitimately proceed in the absence of an accused who has made an initial appearance. While
the SCSL requires that that the accused refuse to attend the proceedings, the STL and the ECCC
rules are not hinged on the refusal requirement.
Rather, the ECCC’s Internal Rules state, and the STL’s rules imply, that the court can
proceed against the accused if he or she fails to attend the proceedings. The ECCC’s rule
declares that the court can proceed against the accused if he or she, “refuse[s] or fails to attend
the proceedings . . . .”93 Thus, the ECCC’s rule covers all of the situations where the accused
willfully refuses to attend trial, and all of the situations where the accused cannot physically
attend trial. Therefore, the ECCC’s rule is broader in its application than the other two rules.
For example, in Sesay, the accused, after prior appearances, chose not to attend the
proceedings as a protest to the legitimacy of the court.94 The SCSL Trial Chamber declared that

92

Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 82 bis, adopted on (29
January 1995), as revised on (1 October 2009). [Reproduced at Tab 33].
93

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 81, Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010. [Reproduced at Tab 26].
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Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., 12 July 2004. [Reproduced at Tab 7].
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the accused’s refusal to attend the proceedings was tantamount to a waiver of the right to be
present.95 The SCSL Appeals Chamber made this declaration under the rule that requires the
accused to refuse to attend the proceedings, in order for the court to proceed in his or her
absence.
Although the court based the Sesay decision on the accused’s willful refusal to exercise
his or her right to be present, the decision still applies to the ECCC’s rule. The ECCC’s rule is
fairly different from the SCSL’s rule because the ECCC’s rule states that the court can proceed
against the accused if he or she refuses or fails to attend the proceedings.96Therefore, after an
initial appearance, if the accused does not attend the following proceedings, the ECCC interprets
his or her non-attendance as a positive action of the accused to not attend trial. Consequently, the
accused’s non-attendance would be tantamount to a waiver of his or her right.
The analysis that the accused actively engaged in activity that waived his right to be
present is consistent with the ICTR’s decision in Zigranyirazo. In Zigranyirazo, the ICTR Trial
Chamber moved the proceedings to The Hague to accommodate a witness, but the accused could
not attend the proceedings.97 The Trial Chamber chose to proceed in the physical absence of the
accused, but the court let the accused and his primary counsel participate through a two-way
video-link.98 The Appeals Chamber held that the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom
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Id.
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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules, Rule 81(4) Rev. 5, as
revised 9 February 2010. [Reproduced at Tab 26].
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was violated because he did not waive his right to be present, and the Appeals Chamber did not
accept the video-link as a form of “presence.”99
The Zigranyirazo case is distinguishable from a case where the accused positively
pursued an action that led to his or her failure to attend trial. In Zigranyirazo, the court—not the
accused—actively pursued actions that led to the accused’s inability to attend the court. Thus, the
accused did not actively waive his right to attend the court. In a situation where the accused
actively pursued an action that led to his or her failure to attend trial, the Trial Chamber would
likely hold that the accused waived his or her right to be present.
C. Illness and the Right to be Present During Proceedings
1. General Opinion Regarding Illness
Under Article 81(5) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules, “[i]f, due to health reasons or other
serious concerns, the Accused cannot be present before the Chamber, it may, with the consent of
the Accused, continue the proceedings in his or her absence.”100 Furthermore, the ECCC’s
Internal Rules provide that the “Chambers may, for the purpose of determining whether a
Charged Person or Accused is physically and mentally fit to stand trial, or for any other reasons,
or at the request of a party, order that they undergo a medical . . . examination by an expert.”101
Many countries acknowledge the principle that when the accused suffers from health
issues, the trial should be suspended until the accused is well. For example, in the John
Demjanjuk trial in Germany, the court canceled “nearly a dozen out of a scheduled 57 court
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The high number of canceled court dates indicates the level of

importance that courts place on the health of the accused.
In Russia, four elderly women were charged with aggravated fraud in 2002.103 The trial
was suspended, in accordance with Russian law, because the women were very elderly and ill.104
By 2010, the trial had yet to proceed, and the women sued the Russian Federation in the
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) for violating their right to a speedy
trial.105 The ECHR held that the Russian Federation violated the accuseds’ rights to a speedy
trial, and it ordered that Russia remunerate the accused for violating their rights.106
The Russian case indicates states’ strict adherence to the rule that when the accused is ill,
they are unfit to stand trial until they are well. Russia adhered to the general rule for so long that
it infringed on the three accuseds’ rights to a speedy trial.
International tribunals also adhere to the principle that when an accused has health issues,
the trial should be suspended until the accused is well. In the Milosevic case, the ICTY
“suspended the proceedings thirteen times because of Milosevic’s ill health, for a total of 66
days.”107 Thus, when the accused is too ill to attend trial, the international community
acknowledges that the trial should be suspended.

David Rising, Demjanjuk’s ills slow Nazi Trial: Defendant 90, accused of serving as guard in
German death camp, N.Y. Times, September 12, 2010. (John Demjanjuk is an accused Nazi War
Criminal) [Reproduced at Tab 35].
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2. The Examination and Fitness of the Accused
The ECCC’s Internal Rules provide that the “Chambers may, for the purpose of
determining whether a Charged Person or Accused is physically and mentally fit to stand trial, or
for any other reasons, or at the request of a party, order that they undergo a medical . . .
examination by an expert.”108 When the chambers examine whether the accused is fit to stand
trial, it examines, “whether he is able to exercise effectively his rights in the proceedings against
him.”109
A fitness hearing of the accused is hardly a new phenomenon in international law. During
the Nuremburg trials, the court examined the accused to determine whether he was fit to stand
trial.110 The court even “granted the postponement of the Accused[‘s] . . . trial until he became
physically and mentally fit.”111
The ICTY, in Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, developed the current standard for assessing
whether the accused is fit to stand trial. In Strugar, the accused suffered from both physical and
mental ailments112 that the defense claimed made him unfit to stand trial.113 The Appeals
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Chamber recognized, “that the issue of an accused’s fitness to stand trial is of such importance
that it may generally be regarded as an issue that would significantly affect fair and expeditious
conduct of the proceedings . . . .”114
The Trial Chamber in Strugar, “set out a non-exhaustive list of the capacities to be
evaluated when assessing an accused’s fitness to stand trial: to plead, to understand the nature of
the charges, to understand the course of the proceedings . . .[and] to instruct counsel . . . .”115 The
Trial Chamber set out this list because the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not set
forward a standard to evaluate the accused’s fitness to stand trial. The Trial Chamber declared
that “fitness or competence to stand trial is a matter which . . . is not confined to establishing
whether a given disorder is present.”116
The Appeals Chamber examined other tribunals’ standards of evaluation in order to
determine whether the Trial Chamber’s standard was a proper evaluation standard.117 The
Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber’s conclusion, and held that the standard was
permissible.
Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber held that, “an accused’s fitness to stand trial should
turn on whether his capacities, viewed overall and in a reasonable and commonsense manner, at
a such a level that it is possible for him or her to participate . . . and sufficiently exercise the
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identified rights.”118 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber held that the accused must prove beyond
a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is unfit to stand trial.119 Under the facts of the
case, the Appeals Chamber held that the accused did not prove beyond a preponderance of the
evidence that he was not able to participate and exercise his rights.120 Thus, the court held that he
was fit to stand trial.121
Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Stanisic et al., the court applied the fitness to stand trial
standard to just the physical ailments of the accused. In Stanisic, the accused suffered from an
intestinal disease that the defense claimed, “significantly impaired . . . his ability to engage in
meaningful preparations for his case . . . .”122 Thus, the defense motioned to declare Stanisic
unfit to stand trial. The prosecution responded that, “the medical evidence submitted . . . does not
reach the threshold level required for an inquiry into the Accused’s fitness to stand trial.”123
The Trial Chamber applied the Strugar standard, and reasoned that, “none of the medical
reports . . . indicate[] any bases on which it might currently be concluded . . . that there is any
respect in which the Accused is unable to participate effectively in his defense . . .”124 Thus, the
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Trial Chamber held that the defense’s motion to declare the accused unfit to stand trial was
unwarranted, and it dismissed the motion.125
Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, the Trial Chamber held that the accused was unfit
to stand trial under the Strugar test.126 The accused had a neurological mental disorder, and the
Trial Chamber required medical experts to examine the accused’s ability to participate in his
defense.127 The doctors considered all of the elements of the Strugar test, and declared that he
was unfit to stand trial.128 The Trial Chamber deferred to the doctors conclusions, and declared
that the accused was unfit to stand trial under the Strugar test.129
Thus, the Strugar, Stanisic, and Kovacevic cases all agree on the standard of declaring the
accused physically and mentally fit to stand trial. The general question the Trial Chamber should
pose is whether the accused is capable of sufficiently exercising his rights and participating in his
defense. As the Kovacevic case indicated, the Trial Chamber must determine whether in the
accused, in his or her mental or physical condition, can exercise his or her rights. If the accused
is unable to exercise his or her rights, and the Trial Chamber proceeds, the Trial Chamber is
effectually depriving the accused of his or her rights.
As the Stanisic case indicated, the Strugar standard applies to both physical and mental
ailments. Furthermore, as the Kovacevic case indicated, the medical experts are an integral piece
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of the ultimate determination of whether the accused is fit to stand trial. Trial Chambers
generally make their determinations based on the medical evidence presented to them. Therefore,
the medical experts draw the line between the accused not attending the proceedings because he
or she is unhealthy, and the accused not attending trial out of disrespect for the Trial Chamber.
3. The Trial Chamber can Consider Some Health Issues a Disruption of the Proceedings
Article 81 of the ECCC’s Internal Rules and Procedure states that the Trial Chamber may
proceed in the absence of the accused, if he or she disrupts the proceedings. 130 Furthermore, the
ECCC’s Internal Rules declare that the Trial Chamber can proceed in the absence of the accused,
if due to health reasons, the accused waives his or her right to be present.131
Although Rule 81 distinguishes an absence due to the accused’s disorder in the
courtroom from an absence due to health issues, the Rule does not dispel the contention that
health issues may disrupt the proceedings. In Milosevic v. Prosecutor, the accused was selfrepresented, but the accused’s health issues delayed the proceedings numerous times.132 The
Trial Chamber imposed an attorney upon the accused because of the numerous health related
postponements of the proceedings.133
The ICTY Appeals Chamber declared that, “it cannot be that the only kind of disruption
legitimately cognizable by a Trial Chamber is the international variety.”134 The Appeals
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Chamber then asked the hypothetical question, “[m]ust the Trial Chamber be forced to choose
between setting [a] defendant free and allowing the case to grind to an effective halt?”135 The
Appeals Chamber then went on to proclaim, “to ask the question is to answer it[,]” and the
Appeals Chamber cited to numerous cases where the accused lost rights because he or she was
too ill to exercise the rights.136 The Appeals Chamber overruled the Trial Chamber, but it did so
on the grounds that the Trial Chamber overly restricted the accused’s right to selfrepresentation.137
Thus, although the accused suffers from an illness, he or she may still disrupt the trial. If
the accused’s illness disrupts the trial, he or she may be forced to forfeit certain rights, provided
the accused is fit to stand trial. While the Milosevic Appeals Chamber debated whether the
accused was forced to forfeit the right to self-representation, the same analysis can be applied to
the accused’s right to be present. If the accused’s illness disrupts the trial to the extent that the
case “grind[s] to an effective halt,” then, under the Milosevic rule, the Trial Chamber can
suspend the accused’s right to be present through the disruption provision. The Trial Chamber
can proceed without the accused’s presence as long as he or she is sufficiently able to participate
in the defense, and sufficiently exercise his other rights.
D. Technology and the Accused
1. Use of Technology in the Courtroom and Previous Experiences
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Technology plays an ever-increasing role in the courtroom, and the ECCC’s Internal
Rules permit the use of technology in various circumstances. Rule 81(5) of the ECCC’s Internal
Rules states that when the accused is too ill to attend trial, “[t]he Accused may . . . request to
follow the proceedings by appropriate audiovisual means.”138
Moreover, under Rule 37(2), “[i]f an Accused disrupts proceedings before the Chambers,
they may order that the Accused be removed from the courtroom . . . .”139 Furthermore, the Trial
Chamber may order that the accused, “where possible, observe the trial over closed-circuit
television . . . [and] in such cases, the Accused may, at all times, remain in telephone contact
with his or her lawyer.”140 Thus, the ECCC’s Internal Rules prescribe numerous situations when
technology is used in the courtroom.
Under the ECCC’s Internal Rules the Trial Chamber “where possible” should make
electronic visual accommodations for accused to view the trial, if he or she was removed for
disruptive behavior. Likewise, the Trial Chamber, only by the accused’s request, must make
electronic visual accommodations for an accused that is too ill to attend trial. Thus, the electronic
visual accommodations are not a fundamental guarantee.
Other international courts and tribunals have similar rules that permit the use of
technology during the proceedings. The ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence declares that,
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“[a]t the request of a party or proprio motu, a Judge or a Chamber may order, if consistent with
the interests of justice, that proceedings be conducted by way of video-conference link.”141
Likewise, the ICC’s rule provides that, “a Chamber may allow a witness to give viva
voce [sic] (oral) testimony before the chambers by means of audio or video technology, provided
that such technology permits the witness to be examined . . . at the time that the witness so
testifies.”142
Numerous international courts previously implemented the use of technology in various
ways. In the Simic case, the ICTY permitted the accused, who had major health issues, to
participate from the detention center through a closed-circuit television and a telephone link
directly to his lawyer.143 The Trial Chamber required that Simic waive his right to be present in
the courtroom, in order to participate through electronic means.144
During the Dujail trial, Saddam Hussein elected not to attend the hearings, and the IHT
arranged “for Sadaam to follow the trial by video link from the detention center . . . .145 The
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judge could have forced Saddam to attend, but the judge perceived that forcing the accused to
attend trial was more unjust, than setting up a closed-circuit video-link.146
In US v. Moussaoui, a United States District Court judge removed the accused for
exhibiting disruptive behavior, and barred him from the jury selection. 147 The court ordered that
the accused view the proceedings through a closed-circuit television in the building.148 The court
viewed the accused’s disruptive behavior as a waiver of the right to be present. Furthermore, the
ban was in place until the judge, “determine[d] that he [was] able to control himself . . . .”149
Thus, previous courts have used technology in situations where the accused was too ill to
attend the trial and the accused disrupted the proceedings. The previous cases all indicate that the
accused must make an affirmative action to lose the right to be present in the courtroom. The
cases further indicate that an electronic presence in the courtroom is not an actual presence in the
courtroom. The accused in everyone of the cases waived his right to be present in one way or
another.
2. The Presence of the Accused in the Courtroom
Under Rule 81, the ECCC’s Internal Rules permit the accused to participate through
video-technology after the accused waived his or her right to be present.150 The ECCC’s Internal
Rules do not define whether the accused is considered present through video-technology. But the
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Internal Rules’ requirement that the accused waive his or her right before video-technology can
be used suggests that the accused is not present through video-technology.
In Zigiranyirazo, the Trial Chamber traveled to The Hague to hear a witness’ testimony,
but the accused could not attend the hearing in The Hague.151 While the Trial Chamber was in
The Hague, the accused was forced to follow the proceedings through a two-way video-link in
Arusha.152 The accused had counsel in the Trial Chamber and his primary counsel with him in
Arusha.153
The ICTR Appeals Chamber examined the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom,
and held that, “the right to be present at trial implies physical presence.”154 The Appeals
Chamber reasoned that the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence clearly distinguish a
physical right to be present from a constructive right to be present.155 Furthermore, the Appeals
Chamber reasoned that the accused’s physical right to be present at trial is, “one of the most
basic and common precepts of a fair criminal trial.”156 The Appeals Chamber ultimately held that
the Trial Chamber violated the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom.157
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The United States Supreme Court examined the definition of presence at trial through the
accused’s right to confront a witness.158 In Maryland v. Craig, a child testified against the
accused through a one-way video television, and the accused claimed that his right to confront
the witness was violated.159 The Supreme Court held that, “[a]lthough face-to-face confrontation
forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause, we have nevertheless
recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right.”160
Although the confrontation clause does not guarantee the right of face-to-face
confrontation of the witness, the Supreme Court held that video technology should only be used
when it is “necessary to further an important state interest.”161 Thus, the court ultimately held
that the child’s one-way video-testimony was admissible.162 The court reasoned that the state had
a valid interest in, “protecting children who are allegedly victims of child abuse from the trauma
of testifying against the alleged perpetrator. “163
In the dissent, Justice Scalia proclaimed that the majority drastically misconstrued the
plain language of the Confrontation Clause. He stated that the purpose of the confrontation
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clause is what it explicitly says, the “right to meet face to face all those who appear and give
evidence at trial.”164
While the majority and the dissent disagree as to the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause, they both agree that the one-way video link does not make the witness present in the
courtroom. Thus, the court developed a rule that governs the situations that the accused can lose
their right to face-to-face confrontation through a one-way video link.
Likewise, the Supreme Court, under an order written by Justice Scalia, rejected the idea
that a witness giving testimony through a two-way video link is present in the courtroom. Justice
Scalia stated,
I cannot comprehend how one-way transmission becomes
transformed into full-fledged confrontation when reciprocal
transmission is added . . . [the] purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make their accusations
in the defendant’s presence-which is not equivalent to making
them in a room that contains a television set beaming electrons that
portray the defendant’s image. Virtual confrontation might be
sufficient to protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it
is sufficient to protect real ones.165

Therefore, even if the two-way video link is present, the United States Supreme Court
does not recognize that the witness is present in the courtroom. This same analysis can be
applied to the accused’s presence in a courtroom. While the video-link may keep the accused upto-date on the proceedings, the video-technology is not an adequate substitute for his or her
presence in the courtroom.
3. An Extended Courtroom
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While electronic presence in the courtroom does not equal physical presence in the
United States Supreme Court, some international courts have extended the courtroom to reach
the person participating through video-technology. Under the ECCC’s Internal Rules, the
accused has the right to confront witnesses, yet the witnesses can appear through a two-way
video-link.166 Thus, in order to permit the accused to exercise his or her right to confront the
witness, the video-linked witness must be considered present in the courtroom through a videolink.
In Prosecutor v. Stanisic et al., the ICTY dealt with the conflict of the accused’s right to
confront the witness and the ability of a witness to give testimony through a two-way videolink.167 In Stanisic, the accused argued that a witness’ testimony through a two-way video-link
violated the accused’s right to, “have a witness examined before him . . . .”168 The ICTY Trial
Chamber reasoned that under the ICTY’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure, a witness may
testify through a two-way video-link.169 The Trial Chamber further reasoned that two-way videotechnology, “should be seen as an extension of the courtroom to the location of the Witnesses
and its use does not prejudice the rights of [the accused] . . . .”170 The Trial Chamber held that
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the accused’s rights were not violated by the witness’s testimony through two-way video-link
technology.171
In Zigiranyirazo, the ICTR Trial Chamber forced the accused to participate through a
two-way video-link from Arusha while the trial was conducted in The Hague.172 The Trial
Chamber moved the proceedings to The Hague because the court did not believe that it could
evaluate the witness’s charts and graphs through video-link.173 The accused had counsel in the
court and his primary counsel with him in Arusha.174 Furthermore, the counsel over the videolink was the primary counsel, but the other counsel in the court could intervene as well.175 The
accused argued that neither the primary counsel nor the accused could “assess the credibility of a
key witness . . . .”176 The Appeals Chamber agreed, and held that the accused’s and his counsel’s
participation through a two-way video-link violated his right to examine the witness because the
accused could not view all of the witness’ diagrams and charts.177 Furthermore, the Appeals
Chamber held that the right to be present was the right to be physically present in the
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courtroom.178 Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber violated the accused’s
right to be present.179
The Zigranyirazo Appeals Chamber declared that the accused was not present in the
court when he appeared through two-way video-technology. In contrast, the Stanisic Trial
Chamber held that witness was present in the court when he appeared through two-way videolink. While the two cases were held in different tribunals, the tribunals had similar provisions,
and both tribunals referenced the other respective tribunal’s case law to interpret the rights of the
accused.180
In both cases the person appeared through a two-way video-link, but in the Zigranyirazo
case the accused’s rights were hindered by the video-link because the accused could not fully
“assess the credibility of a key witness . . . .”181 Therefore, the combination of the two cases
suggests that when the video-technology did not inhibit the accused’s rights, the person using the
technology was considered present in the courtroom. Contrarily, when the accused’s rights were
inhibited by the technology, the person using the technology was not considered in the
courtroom. Thus, one could argue that the logical inference is that as long as the technology does
not hinder the accused’s rights, “the courtroom is expanded” to the location of the person
participating through the video-link.
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If the ECCC expanded the location of the courtroom to the location of the accused
participating through the video-link, it would be following a previous practice of expanding the
courtroom to protect the accused’s rights.182 This expansion is especially relevant in situations
where the accused cannot sufficiently exercise the right to be present in the courtroom because
he or she is physically unable to attend the court, but her or she is still fit to stand trial.
Many scholars follow the logic of the Appeals Chamber in Zigiranyirazo, and they argue
that the accused cannot fully experience the proceedings through technology.183 Professor Anne
Poulin,184 argues that the accused cannot make eye contact, nor can the accused notice the nonverbal cues of witnesses.185 Furthermore, she argues that the judges are similarly restrained in
their assessment of the accused.186
The issues that Professor Poulin raises are easily combated by the use of increased
amounts of technology. A system could be created that would show both full body shots of the
accused, and a close up of the accused’s face. This would combat the issues of the judges not
being able to fully assess the accused’s non-verbal actions. Furthermore, the accused could have
similar technology that would allow him or her to view the entire courtroom, and the facial
expressions of the witnesses and judges. While such an expansive use of technology is
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unprecedented,187 it would combat Professor Poulin’s argument, and it would similarly address
the concerns raised by the Appeals Chamber in Zigiranyirazo.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ECCC can proceed in the absence of the accused, if the accused: 1) consents to be
absent, 2) boycotts the trial, 3) fails to attend the trial, or 4) outlandishly disrupts the trial.
Although the ECCC’s Internal Rules provide only that the accused can consent to waive his or
her right to attend trial if he or she is ill, international opinion suggests that he or she can waive
the right at any time. Furthermore, in the event that the court limits accused’s right to attend trial,
the court must apply the proportionality test, and only restrict the right to the degree necessary to
achieve the court’s goals.
On the other hand, the ECCC cannot proceed against the accused in his or her total
absence from all of the proceedings. If the accused does appear for one hearing, however, the
court can proceed from that point forward without the accused’s presence.
In the event that the accused is ill, the court may still be able to proceed against the
accused. As long as the accused is able to sufficiently exercise his or her rights and participate in
his or her defense, the accused is considered fit to stand trial. If the accused cannot participate in
his or her defense because the accused cannot attend trial, the court may rule that the ailment is
disruptive to the proceedings. Thus, the court can implement Rule 37(2), which provides that if
the accused disrupts the proceedings, the court can proceed against the accused. Therefore, the
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court can still proceed against the accused if he or she cannot physically attend the trial, but can
assist in his or her defense.
Likewise, in every situation where the accused disrupts the proceedings, or consents to a
waiver of the right to be present, the court can set up a two-way video-link between the
accused’s location and the courtroom. Furthermore, the court can establish a telephone link
between the accused and his or her counsel.
The two-way video-link does not always constitute physical presence in the courtroom.
When a witness testifies through a two-way video-link, however, previous courts “extended the
courtroom” to the witness’ location to protect the accused’s right to confront the witness in court.
Thus, although the witness participating through the video-link is not considered physically
present through the link itself, the court could extend the courtroom to the witness’s location.
The previous courts extended the courtroom to protect the accused’s right to confront a witness
in court.
As long as the two-way video-link does not hinder the accused’s right of participation,
the ECCC could “extend the courtroom” to the accused’s physical location. The court’s
extension of the courtroom to the accused’s location solves the problems that arise from an
accused that cannot attend the court because he or she is too ill. Furthermore, in such a case, the
court is only extending the courtroom, as other courts have in the past, in order to protect the
rights of the accused.
In order to protect the accused’s rights, the court must be equipped with advanced video
and audio technology that would not inhibit the accused’s rights to examine a witness, and fully
participate in the court proceedings. This expansive use of technology is unprecedented in
criminal proceedings. But multiple televisions and multiple two-way audio-video transmissions,
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as well as a closed direct phone line to his or her lawyer, would combat the arguments that the
accused’s rights were inhibited by the technology.
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